It was a rare public appearance for Barnes, who has operated mostly in quiet as chair. Last week, he penned a message to the campus community saying he was “appalled” by the behavior in the Theta Tau videos. That was the first time he has personally addressed the full campus community as chairman, according to SU News archives.
Even as Barnes has functioned in a space unseen by some, he has left a lasting mark on the university, where policies and initiatives in recent years have closely resembled common Bain managerial approaches.
Barnes has brought 30 years of experience as an executive at Bain Capital to his positions of power. The firm has developed a healthy reputation of creating profit for its investors, but it has also generated controversy for what critics call “vulture capitalism.” Bain has sometimes profited from companies — like Toys R Us — that it led into bankruptcy and through periods of mass layoffs.
The Bain & Company-led assessment of SU suggested several Bain models that have fundamentally changed the institution. Efforts to cut costs, a regular Bain strategy, reduced and rearranged the university’s staff. The creation of the Academic Strategic Plan set a new institutional mission that features a heavy emphasis on SU’s military and veterans programs — a pocket of campus Barnes has long financially supported and led.
Prominent university officials see the influence Barnes has had and speak glowingly of him. Vice Chancellor Mike Haynie, who holds a faculty position endowed by Barnes, in an email called Barnes “a deeply passionate alumnus.” Dick Thompson, who served as chair of the board before Barnes, said Barnes has “done an exceptional job.” Syverud said in an email that Barnes “has a unique understanding of and respect for the culture of Syracuse University.”
Others within the campus community are less encouraged by the institutional changes SU has endured since Barnes was named chair. Some staff and faculty say SU’s cost-cutting tendencies have reduced morale and productivity in academic departments. Others fear the military-focused mission will undermine academic freedom by discouraging research and teachings critical of United States foreign policy.
“The head of the Board of Trustees works for Bain. How is that possible? Bain’s policies are the ones that are being pushed at Syracuse University,” said Tula Goenka, a professor of television, radio and film, and a University Senator. “It’s a very corporate model. And it’s not a model for education.”
Barnes was not made available for an interview for this story, nor did he agree to answer questions via email. Instead, he provided this statement:
“Syracuse University had such a positive impact on my life and for that I am deeply appreciative. It is a privilege to be able to give back to the University through my volunteer service and through my family’s philanthropic support to help ensure that others have similar opportunities to achieve their dreams. Helping the University achieve its vision of being a pre-eminent and inclusive student-focused research university is at the core of everything I do — as an alumnus, as Board chair and as a supporter of my alma mater.”
‘Building something to collapse’
SU Magazine and SU News stories about Barnes often include that he was once CEO of Dade Behring, a company that manufactured machinery for the medical diagnostics industry. These references to Dade are published alongside praises for Barnes — a “turnaround expert” with “a unique capacity to grow and build great companies” — and his career, “an epic success story.”
But while Barnes was CEO of Dade, the company struggled to survive. After Bain Capital used mostly debt to purchase the company, Barnes drove Dade into further debt, and it ultimately went bankrupt. But Barnes, Bain and its investors made millions by having Dade pay Bain generous dividends.
The tactics Bain used at Dade fell in line with the strategy the firm typically employs, according to experts. When purchasing companies, Bain often uses significant amounts of debt, so the firm risks less of its own money and still gets a controlling stake. It’s then on the individual companies — not Bain — to repay the debt, and Bain and its partners can often guarantee a profit for themselves even if the companies fail by extracting fees and dividends, experts said.
“Whenever I say this, it just blows people’s minds,” said Eileen Appelbaum, co-author of the book “Private Equity at Work” and a private equity expert, referring to the debt-financing strategy. “… That’s like you buying your neighbor’s house with the big mortgage. You own the house, but your neighbor has to pay the mortgage.”
In a statement, a Bain Capital representative said the firm “has been focused on growing great companies and improving their operations” since its founding.
Bain and other investors, including Goldman Sachs, purchased the company that would become Dade Behring in 1994 for more than $400 million, using mostly borrowed money, according to media reports and “The Buyout of America,” a book examining the effects of private equity on the U.S. economy. Bain put down about $30 million of its own money.
Barnes left Bain to become an executive at Dade in 1996 and became CEO the following year. With debt soaring in 1997, Barnes had the company begin cutting costs by laying off hundreds of workers and reducing employee benefits.
In 1999, Dade, still under the direction of Barnes, borrowed hundreds of millions of dollars to repurchase shares from Bain and Goldman Sachs. Through that agreement, Bain earned $242 million — about eight times its original investment — and Barnes personally received about $3.38 million, according to Securities and Exchange Commission documents. Shortly thereafter, Barnes stepped down as CEO and returned to Bain. Dade eventually filed for bankruptcy and was taken over by creditors after failing to recover from the debt it faced following the stock repurchase program.
“If you are Barnes or Bain or their investors, you probably would look at Dade as a pretty good success story. They made a lot of money from Dade,” said Josh Kosman, author of “The Buyout of America.” “But if you were to look at it in another way, Dade went bankrupt largely because of Bain’s actions, and a lot of people got fired.”
Bain’s strategies are common in private equity, but experts said Bain is sometimes particularly aggressive. A 2012 Wall Street Journal analysis found that, of 77 businesses Bain invested in from 1984 until early 1999, 22 percent either filed for bankruptcy or went out of business within eight years after Bain first invested, “sometimes with substantial job losses.”